The true cost of greenhouse gas emissions: Analysis of 1,000 global companies by Ishinabe, Nagisa et al.
The True Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Analysis of
1,000 Global Companies
Nagisa Ishinabe1, Hidemichi Fujii2, Shunsuke Managi2,3*
1Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States of America, 2Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Tohoku
University, Sendai, Japan, 3 Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Hayama, Kanagawa, Japan
Abstract
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number of studies have calculated the shadow price of GHG emissions, these studies have employed country-level or
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shadow price of GHG emissions can play an important role in developing climate policy and promoting sustainable
development.
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Introduction
Our study focuses on the true cost of emissions reduction at the
firm level by computing the evidence-based shadow price of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by company, which is estimated
by a production function approach using GHG data. The study
covers 1,024 major companies of 17 industries in 37 countries over
the period from 2002 to 2009. This survey allows us to observe the
patterns of the shadow price of GHG emissions among firms and
sectors over many years and to examine efficient and effective
pathways to transform our socio-economic systems into sustainable
systems.
To ameliorate the effects of climate change, each country in the
world is currently advancing research on GHG reduction methods
and the costs of such reductions [1–2]. Although many previous
studies have focused on the shadow price of GHG, most of these
studies are focused on future shadow prices at the national and
global levels based on projected scenarios and do not actually
calculate the current shadow price or calculate the shadow price at
the company level3. Therefore, when regulations pertaining to the
total quantity of GHG emissions are introduced, the degree of
impact on each company in each country is uncertain. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to allay the concerns of companies in any
country as to whether they will suffer an adverse effect on their
international competitiveness when carbon constraints are im-
posed. As a result, companies and countries are currently not
assuming obligations to reduce the total quantity of GHG
emissions. Therefore, this study determines the present shadow
price and the effect of market competitiveness in terms of GHG
emissions at the company level as well as the degree of impact on
each company under carbon constraints and on its international
competitiveness when reductions in the total quantity of GHG
emissions are introduced.
Methods
The shadow price that is calculated by a production function is
equivalent to the revenue to be sacrificed when a company is
forced to reduce one ton of GHG emissions. A lower shadow price
signals that it is relatively less expensive to reduce GHGs. The
shadow price captures the holistic price of GHG emissions for a
company by considering both technological advancements and
operational efficiencies (e.g., switching off lights and ensuring the
optimal use of materials) by employing all firm-level data. As a
result, the shadow price is distinct from technology-based
abatement costs or GHG intensity, which captures the cost of
only a single technology or the ratio of GHG emissions and sales.
The economic valuation method for handling environmentally
undesirable outputs using the directional distance function (DDF)
as a nonparametric approach was developed by [3–4]. Following
[3], we can estimate q, the economic value of an environmentally
undesirable output (shadow price), using the measure below.
We denote x [ <Lz, b [ <Rz and y [ <Mz as the vectors of
inputs, environmental output (or undesirable output), and market
outputs (or desirable output), respectively, and we then define the
production technology as follows:
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P(x)~ (x,y,b) : x can produce (y,b)f g ð1Þ
The inefficiency D(x, y, b| gx, gy, gb) of the production units in
P(x) for each of the firms in this study is defined with the distance
from the production frontier consisting of the efficient production
units as follows:
D
!
(x,y,bDgx,gy,gb)~Sup b : yzbgy,b{bgb
 
[ P(x{bgx)
  ð2Þ
where gx, gy, and gb denote the non-negative directional vectors of
the input, the desirable output, and the undesirable output,
respectively. From the above definition, equation (3) is determined
to be valid.
y,bð Þ[P xð Þ if and only if D x,y,bDgx:gy:gb
 
§0 ð3Þ
Under a perfect competitive market, the prices of market goods, p,
and the prices of undesirable goods, q, are assumed to be p.0 and
q ,0, respectively. If the aggregate economic value of the output
for each production unit is given by R(x, p, q), then the specific
combination of y and b to maximize py+qb, (y*,b*)eP(x) for given
prices of p and q exists in the production possibility set. Therefore,
R(x, p, q) can be expressed as follows:
R x,p,qð Þ~Max y,bð Þ pyzqbD(y,b) [ P xð Þf g ð4Þ
Here, with equation (3), R(x, p, q) becomes the following:
R x,p,qð Þ~Max y,bð Þ pyzqbD :ð Þ§0f g ð5Þ
where D(x, y, b| gx, gy, gb) is expressed as D(?). Given that equation
(5) is formed for any pairs ( y, b) P(x), the relation
( y*,b*) = ( y+D(?)6gy, b+D(?)6gb) can replace equation (5). Thus,
R x,p,qð Þ is obtained as follows:
R x,p,qð Þ~Max y,bð Þ p yzD :ð Þgy
 
zq bzD :ð Þgbf gD :ð Þ§0
 
§ p yzD :ð Þgy
 
zq bzD :ð Þgbf gD :ð Þ§0
 
~ pyzqbz pgyzqgb
 
|D :ð ÞD :ð Þ§0 
ð6Þ
Furthermore,
0ƒD :ð Þƒ R x,p,qð Þ{ pyzqbð Þf g pgyzqgb
  ð7Þ
Simultaneously, because R(x, p, q) is function of p and q (hence,
for any pairs (y,b) e P(x)), a certain p and q exists to satisfy the
following relationship:
D :ð Þ~Min p,qð Þ R x,p,qð Þ{ pyzqbð Þf g

pgyzqgb
   ð8Þ
Executing the partial differentiation for both sides of equation
(8) with respect to b and y, equations (9) and (10), respectively, can
be derived:
LD(:)
Lb
~
{q
pgyzqgb
§0 ð9Þ
LD(:)
Ly
~
{p
pgyzqgb
ƒ0 ð10Þ
Equation (9) describes the extent of the increase in inefficiency
D(?) while emitting an additional environmental undesirable
output by one unit marginally. Similarly, equation (10) describes
the extent of the decrease in inefficiency D(?), while increasing the
additional market output by one unit marginally. Combining
equations (9) and (10) then results in equation (11):
q
p
~
LD(:)=Lb
LD(:)=Ly
ð11Þ
Therefore, by simply solving equation (11) with q, the economic
value of the environmentally undesirable output is defined as
follows:
q~p|
LD(:)=Lb
LD(:)=Ly
ð12Þ
Here, the economic value of the market output can be
normalized as p = 1 if the market output variable consists of
monetary data; thus, the economic value q is regarded as the value
of the environmentally undesirable good relative to the value of
the market goods.
We can estimate the adjusted shadow price qadj, the economic
value of an environmentally undesirable output considering an
inefficiency score, using the following measure:
qadj~p|
LD
!
(x,y,b)
.
Lb

LD
!
(x,y,b)
.
Ly
|
sb
sy
ð13Þ
where (y*, b*) is the intersecting point on the frontier curve with
the directional vector of an inefficient province. The inefficiency
factors sb and sy are defined as follows:
sb~
1
1zD
!
(x,y,b)
gb
b
ð14Þ
sy~
1
1{D
!
(x,y,b)
gy
y
ð15Þ
Here, we set the production function using input x, undesirable
output b, and desirable output y. We assume desirable and
undesirable outputs under a null-joint hypothesis; a company
cannot produce a desirable output without producing undesirable
outputs.
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(y,b)[P(x); b~0[y~0 ð16Þ
We also assume weak disposability. Weak disposability implies
that the pollutant should not be considered freely disposable.
(y,b)[P(x) and 0ƒbƒ1[(by,bb)[P(x) ð17Þ
Under the null-joint hypothesis and weak disposability, this
directional distance function can be computed for firm k by solving
the following optimization problem:
D
!
(xlk,y
m
k ,b
r
k Dgxl ,gym ,gbr )~Maximize bk ð18Þ
s:t:
XN
i~1
lix
l
iƒx
l
kzbkgxl l~1,
:::,L ð19Þ
XN
i~1
liy
m
i §y
m
kzbkgym m~1,
:::,M ð20Þ
XN
i~1
lib
r
i~b
r
kzbkgbr r~1,
:::,R ð21Þ
li§0 i~1,:::,N ð22Þ
where l, m, and r are the input, the desirable output, and the
undesirable output, respectively; x is the input factor in the L6N
input factor matrix; y is the desirable output in the M 6 N
desirable output factor matrix; and b is the undesirable output
factor in the R6N undesirable output matrix. In addition, gx is
the directional vector of the input factor, gy is the directional
vector of the desirable output factors, and gb is the directional
vector of the undesirable output factors. is the inefficiency score of
the kth firm, and is the weight variable. To estimate the
inefficiency score of all firms, the model must be independently
applied N times for each firm. One objective of this study is to
clarify the extent to which firms have improved their levels of
productivity with respect to the CO2 emissions under consider-
ation. We set the directional vector as (gx, gy, gb) = (0, y
m, br) to
estimate the productivity change by applying the Luenberger
productivity indicator. Under this directional vector setting, we
obtain the following equation.
Objective function
Max: bk ð23Þ
Restriction
XN
i~1
yq,ili§(1zbk)yq,k q~revenue ð24Þ
XN
i~1
xp,iliƒxp,k p~cogs,capital ð25ÞTa
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XN
i~1
br,ili~(1{bk)br,k r~CO2 emissions ð26Þ
XN
i~1
liƒ1 ð27Þ
li§0 (i~1,2,:::,k,:::,N) ð28Þ
The model above estimates the inefficiency score by considering
the extent to which a company can reduce its CO2 emissions and
increase its revenue without increasing the cogs and capital. b
represents the inefficiency score, and b .0 indicates that firm k
inefficiently discharges CO2 emissions and loses revenue com-
pared with the efficient firms that form the production frontier line
curve.
Equation (27) representing the DDF model has applied the
decreasing return-to-scale (DRS) assumption. The DDF model
commonly requires the return-to-scale assumption. In this study,
we apply the DRS assumption to avoid an infeasible calculation in
the time series analysis. Note that assuming DRS does not
eliminate the possibility of infeasible linear programming (LP)
problems when weak disposability is imposed on bad outputs.
When we model bad outputs in LP, the potential for infeasible LP
problems results from imposing weak disposability on the
undesirable outputs and from specifying an LP problem that uses
period t reference technology with observations from period t+1.
The variable return-to-scale (VRS) model tends to yield infeasible
results more often than the DRS model when computing the
productivity change because the VRS has stronger restrictions for
solving a linear program. We confirmed with our models that the
calculation of productivity changes under the VRS is infeasible.
Therefore, we applied the DRS model in this study.
This study used the GHG emissions data and sales revenues by
industry provided by the Trucost, and financial data provided by
the Factset, respectively. Therefore, this study used data from
these two companies, which is considered to ensure the highest
level of quality of the data available at present.
The Trucost’s GHG emissions data is created by taking the
quantity of GHG emissions disclosed by the businesses through
environmental and financial reports supplemented by Trucost’s
own processes of verification and modification. When verifying the
data, Trucost confirms whether each company reports irregular
figures by comparing the reported data with calculations of the
plausible quantities of GHG emissions based on the quantity of
energy used by the business in question, as well as by comparison
with the GHG emissions of other companies in the same industry.
Figure 1. Shadow price by sector.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078703.g001
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Furthermore, if in this process a figure that could be considered
irregular is discovered, interviews are held with representatives
from the company concerned and corrections are made as
required for the maintenance of the database. Since the data set
is not a collection of unverified data released voluntarily by
individual businesses, their data quality is better than data sets of
Carbon Disclosure Project and similar sources, which is provided
directly by the firms. At present, this is the most reliable database.
Regarding financial data, because this is reported by each
company pursuant to the accounting standards of each country,
and because each type of figure has undergone corporate auditing,
reliable data that enables comparisons between companies can be
obtained relatively easily. This study used the figures of the
Factset, which is one of the largest business financial data firms in
the world. Note that since accounting standards vary depending
on the country, figures were used that were recompiled according
to the Factset standard (a global integrated standard created by
Factset). US dollars were adopted as the currency, and, after
consolidating the exchange rates as of the end of the accounting
year for each year, the figures were deflated to the year-2000
prices.
The research period covered in this study is in principle the
eight-year period from 2002. The 17 industry sectors subject to
analysis in this study are Automobiles & Parts, Basic Resources
(including steel and paper industries), Chemicals, Oil & Gas,
Utilities, Industrial Goods & Services, Construction & Materials,
Personal & Household Goods, Telecommunications, Technology,
Healthcare, Travel & Leisure, Retail, Food & Beverage, Financial,
Real Estate, and Media services. For the classification of businesses
into industry sectors, the ICB-Super Sector classification of the
Financial Times of the UK and the London Stock Exchange
which creates finance-related indexes, was referenced. In addition,
retail, financial, and real estate services were integrated to ensure a
sufficient quantity of data in each industry when running the
model.
The data used comes under sales revenues, cost of goods sold
(COGS), total assets, current assets, and GHG emissions (for the
six gases listed for reduction in the Kyoto Protocol). For a figure
for capital, fixed assets (total assets minus current assets) was
chosen, and to express the (total) amount of labor and materials
used, cost of goods sold was chosen. Cost of goods sold is the costs
required to provide goods and services. For GHG emissions it was
decided that all three scope categories would be included: Scope 1
Figure 2. Inefficiency score by country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078703.g002
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(emissions in manufacturing processes), Scope 2 (emissions due to
power usage among others), and Scope 3 (other emissions from
commuting, business trips, and the supply chain).
This study applies the emission data for all the categories of
Scope 1, 2, and 3 because of the following reasons; (1) using all
three enables a more thorough assessment of the overall picture of
each company’s GHG emissions and (2) since this study covers a
broad range of industries, including IT, Media, Healthcare, and
financial institutions, rather than specifically the manufacturing
industry, limiting the scope would increase the number of cases
that do not reflect the actual state of the company. However,
standards for the supply chain data in Scope 3 are currently being
debated in each industry, so the figures were deemed unworkable
for comparisons between companies at present and it was decided
to use only those for GHG emitted during the use of airplanes,
railroads among others.
Results
The average shadow price of GHG emissions for the observed
sample of 1,024 companies in 37 countries worldwide is $10,414,
and the median price is $4,189; these values are much higher than
the corresponding values in any of the previous studies (Table 1).
The reason for the higher shadow price is the use of the Scope
3 GHG emissions data in this study. This research implies that a
firm would carry a high cost of GHG emissions if Scope 3 GHG
emissions were the focus of discussions regarding corporate social
responsibility. In fact, 10% of the observed companies may reduce
emissions at a cost of $100 or less, approximately 30% at $1,000 or
less, and 70% at $10,000 or less. Germany’s median shadow price
is the highest at a price of $9,423 among the six countries with
more than 200 observations: the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan, France, and China (including Hong Kong and
Taiwan). France follows Germany at a price of $8,697, with the
United Kingdom at $7,335, the United States at $3,340, China at
$4,316, and Japan at $2,332 (see Figure S1 and Figure S2).
Among these six countries, the proportion of companies that
could reduce emissions at $100 or less is the largest in China at a
rate of 14%, followed by the United States at 10%, but this order
changes at shadow prices of $1,000 and $10,000 or less. At $1,000
or less, Japan’s proportion becomes the second largest at a rate of
35%, slightly below China at 36%. At $10,000 or less, Japan’s
proportion becomes the largest at a rate of 83%, followed by the
United States and China, both at 74%. Although the number of
observations in emerging countries is limited, the study found that
a majority of companies in certain emerging countries can reduce
emissions relatively inexpensively. For instance, 63% of the
observed companies in Indonesia can reduce emissions at $20 or
less, followed by 52% in Thailand and 35% in Malaysia. These
price gaps among different countries indicate the economic
rationale for an emissions trading scheme and the importance of
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to achieve emissions
reductions on a global level.
In addition, a large disparity was found to exist between the
average and median shadow prices, suggesting that the average
price in each country is being supported by a set of companies
and that many companies can reduce emissions relatively
inexpensively.
The shadow price is the lowest for utilities companies at a
median price at $46, followed by construction and material
companies at $65 and basic resource companies at $184; by
contrast, the price is the highest in the technology sector at
$22,092 (Table 2). Shadow prices are relatively low in heavy
industries such as construction and materials at $65 and basic
resources at $184, and more than 50% of the observed companies
in these industries can reduce emissions at a cost of $100 or less.
Half of the observed companies in the oil and gas and chemicals
industries can reduce emissions at a cost of $1,000 or less, whereas
the shadow prices in the technology and media sectors are high–
only a low percentage of the observed companies in these sectors
can reduce emissions at a cost of $1,000 or less. If a cap on
emissions were introduced at the same level in all industries, then
those most readily affected would be industries with high shadow
prices, such as technology and media, and those least affected
would be industries with low shadow prices, such as utilities and
basic resources.
Discussion
There are major disparities in the shadow price both among
industries and within industries–some companies can reduce
emissions at a relatively inexpensive price, whereas others cannot,
even in the same industry (Figure 1). This disparity is particularly
evident in industries such as technology, personal and household
goods, and media. This finding supports the idea of a cap and
trade emissions scheme because the variations in the shadow price
for different companies suggests that it is economically efficient to
trade carbon credits between companies with a low cost of
emissions reductions and those with a high cost. The wide
variation of shadow prices among companies within individual
industries further indicates that an emissions trading scheme could
be established not only among industries but also within industries;
even if the system targets a single domestic sector, it is still effective.
A shadow price that varies by company also assists in explaining
which firms would become sellers and buyers of carbon credits and
thus in determining the approximate quantities bought and sold in
carbon markets. If the same level of carbon constraints (total
quantity reduction) were to be imposed on all industries, then
technology and other industries with high shadow prices would
become buyers of carbon credits, and utilities and other industries
with low shadow prices would become sellers. However, in reality,
it is highly unlikely that the same level of emissions cap would be
introduced for all industries, given their differing quantities of
GHG emissions. As in the cap and trade system, it would be
possible to estimate the tax burden on each business if an
environmental tax were introduced.
Fig. 1 indicates that the shadow price of GHG emissions in the
utility sector is much lower than in other sectors. The average
shadow price of utility companies is $245 per ton of GHG, and the
median is $46 per ton of GHG. The results reveal that 35% of the
observed companies can reduce emissions at $20 per ton of GHG
or less, 60% at $100 per ton of GHG or less, and 75% at $180 per
ton of GHG or less. Furthermore, more than 40% of the observed
companies in the United States can reduce emissions at $20 per
ton of GHG or less. Moreover, a majority of companies in these
five countries can reduce emissions at $100 per ton of GHG or
less.
Fig. 2 shows the operating efficiency (inefficiency score) by
country in terms of the GHG emissions for 1,024 companies in 37
countries worldwide during the eight-year period from 2002
through 2009. The six countries shown in the figure are the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, China (including
Hong Kong and Taiwan), and Germany, all of which had large
sample sizes; the number in parentheses is the frontier percentage
(the percentage of results that were assessable as having an
inefficiency score of zero and as conducting efficient operations)
for each country.
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Each country has companies with a high level of operating
efficiency (companies with low inefficiency scores) and companies
with low operating efficiency (companies with high inefficiency
scores) (see Fig. 2). Because the data sample from the companies in
the United States is the largest, the curve for the United States
swings far to the right, but the frontier percentage clearly indicates
that the United States does not simply have an especially high
concentration of top-quality companies that would constitute the
frontier curve. In fact, quality companies exist in every country in
the world, and although quality companies may be concentrated
in the center of the sample, the existence of frontier companies in
China at a similar percentage relative to those in the United
Kingdom indicates that any misconception of emerging market
businesses being synonymous with inefficient businesses should be
eliminated. Moreover, frontier companies and inefficient compa-
nies are not distributed in a manner that indicates that companies
in advanced countries are synonymous with highly efficient
companies or that emerging market companies are synonymous
with inefficient companies. Rather, inefficient companies exist in
every country, which suggests that a general improvement in such
companies is required to reduce the world’s GHG emissions and
to ensure continued economic growth (see Table S1 and Figure
S3). To reduce GHG emissions in the world, policy measures are
needed to advance operations, and such measures need to consider
the GHG emissions of companies in specific countries or regions
and the emissions in all countries.
Policy Implications
Disparities in market competitiveness originate from the
medium- to long-term management efforts of businesses, and
eliminating these disparities is time consuming because it requires
improvements in operating technology.
The figures and tables above indicate that there are major
disparities in the shadow price, both among industries and within
industries, similar to the disparities observed in market compet-
itiveness. This finding appears to have extremely important
implications concerning the administration of environmental
issues, especially for the design and introduction of emissions
trading schemes, as the research findings support the introduction
of emissions trading schemes from all perspectives. Emissions
trading schemes allow for the flexible fulfillment of GHG
reduction obligations by establishing limits (gaps) for GHG
emissions and allowing trading within those emissions limits. By
allowing companies and groups with varying GHG reduction costs
to trade emission rights according to their respective needs,
inexpensive initiatives to reduce emissions will be selected
efficiently, thus promoting the efficient reduction of emissions for
society as a whole.
In this study, the shadow prices were found to vary greatly, both
within and outside of industries. The disparities in shadow prices
that were observed in this study clearly indicate that the
introduction of emissions trading schemes would make it
economically rational for companies with high shadow prices to
trade emissions rights with companies with low shadow prices to
promote the overall reduction of GHG emissions in an efficient
manner in Japan and in other countries. Furthermore, the finding
that shadow prices are widely divergent among individual
companies, both across industries and within industries, indicates
that emissions trading schemes could be established not only
among industries but also within industries. In other words,
emissions trading schemes could function meaningfully even if
they target a single domestic industry.
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